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Abstract   The basic hypothesis of this paper is that the amount of fishing that a
fish harvester undertakes during a year is not determined entirely by circum-
stances which are exogenous to the fisher, such as weather conditions and
resource availability, but is also partially a matter of individual choice. The pa-
per develops a behavioral model of fishing from the perspective that the
decision to modify the period of time over which fishing takes place is governed
by a comparison of the marginal benefits and costs of doing so. The model is
tested econometrically as an error-components model using a 10% longitudinal
sample of recipients of seasonal fishermen’s unemployment insurance benefits in
Newfoundland over the period 1971–93. The results suggest that the Canadian
unemployment insurance program has reduced the length of the fishing season
in Newfoundland by about 8–10 weeks.
Key words   Error-components model, fishing season, unemployment insurance.
Introduction
The basic hypothesis of this paper is that the amount of fishing that a fish harvester
undertakes during a year is not determined entirely by circumstances which are ex-
ogenous to the fisher, such as weather conditions and resource availability, but
is also partially a matter of individual choice. As such, the decision can be ana-
lyzed with the usual apparatus that economists apply to choice decisions at the
margin, from the perspective that the decision to modify the period of time over
which fishing takes place is governed by a comparison of the marginal benefits
and costs of doing so. Changes in these marginal benefits and costs, through in-
stitutional modifications or otherwise, can alter the balance between these two, and
so lead to a change in the decision as to how long during the year to pursue the fish-
ing activity.
The marginal benefits and costs of fishing an additional week are an individual
matter that depends on both the productivity and the preferences of the individual
fisher. Therefore, testing the basic hypothesis should also be done at the individual
level. The existence of a social insurance program in Canada, to which fishers have
access, provides us with the opportunity to engage in such testing.
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The Canadian unemployment insurance program was established in order to en-
able the government to insure employees against the consequences of job loss. It has
been a fixture of the Canadian social welfare system since 1940. The program was
governed by an Unemployment Insurance Act1 which was enacted in 1971 and only
recently (May 1996) supplanted by new legislation (which has been renamed the
Employment Insurance Act).
Normally, an unemployment insurance claimant must have been engaged in an
employment contract in order to qualify for benefits. Self-employed persons nor-
mally do not qualify for coverage. The one exception to this general prohibition is
provided in section 130 of the Act, which enables the Canada Employment and Im-
migration Commission to operate a scheme of unemployment insurance for “self-
employed persons engaged in fishing.” Such a scheme has been in existence since
1956. The program provides fishers with benefits during their off-season, in
amounts dependent upon earnings during the fishing season. The Special Seasonal
Fishermen’s Benefits Program has become a fundamental support mechanism for in-
shore fisheries on the Atlantic coast of Canada.2
The Unemployment Insurance Act that governed the program was approved by
the Parliament of Canada in 1971, replacing less generous legislation. After an ini-
tial period of stability, perceived difficulties with the Act led to a series of amend-
ments between 1976 and 1980. Other than amendments passed in 1983 in response
to recommendations by the Kirby Task Force on the Atlantic Fisheries, the Act re-
mained essentially unchanged until 1996 insofar as inshore fishermen in Newfound-
land, the focus of our analysis, were concerned.
The existence of the program enables us to test hypotheses on fishers’ deci-
sions about the duration of their fishing activity during the year. First, the program
provides us with a longitudinal panel of data covering the individual earnings of
fishers, the number of weeks worked during the fishing season, and the unemploy-
ment insurance benefits received as a result. Second, the program structure creates
considerable variation in the incentives provided to fishermen, and does so both lon-
gitudinally and across individuals. The reason for this variation is that the benefit
entitlement of fishers varies considerably from case to case, depending on individual
circumstances. It also varies from year to year as the rules governing the determina-
tion of benefits change. This contrast in incentives enables us to infer matching con-
trasts in behavior.
The Unemployment Insurance Act could potentially have influenced the behav-
ior of inshore fishers in three ways: (i) by altering the attractiveness of fishing rela-
tive to other forms of economic activity, unemployment insurance can affect the
number of people engaging in fishing as a full-time or part-time occupation; (ii) by
modifying the returns to fishing, it can change the length of time that fishers engage
in this activity during the year; and (iii) it can also change the intensity with which
fishers are prepared to fish at any particular time.
Changes of the first kind have been analyzed by Ferris and Plourde (1980,
1982), who concluded, on the basis of aggregate data over the period 1956–68, that
the presence of unemployment insurance in this period accounted for one-half
of the inshore fishing boats in Newfoundland  (Ferris and Plourde 1980, p.
116). Since the database used in this paper contains no information on alterna-
tive employment opportunities, we can provide no additional insight into this
1 An Act Respecting Unemployment Insurance in Canada, R.S.C. 1985, C. U-1.
2 The historical background underlying this anomaly is discussed in considerable detail in Schrank
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particular question. The paper instead focuses on changes of the second kind,
which are changes in the length of time spent fishing during the year as a result
of the unemployment insurance program. Such changes have been the subject of
early speculations by Copes (1972, p. 69) and formal theoretical modeling by Ferris
and Plourde (1980, 1982). It has, however, appeared to have escaped detailed em-
pirical analysis.
The basic structure of the Canadian unemployment insurance program as it af-
fects inshore fishermen is outlined in the next section of the paper. Then, the paper
briefly outlines a behavioral model of the decision to fish in a particular week
within the season.3 The next section presents econometric estimation of the relation-
ship between fishing earnings and fishing weeks, while the subsequent section ex-
tends the model to incorporate the decision by individual fishermen as to how many
weeks in the year to engage in fishing. Some limitations and possible extensions of
the analysis are discussed in the final section of the paper.
The Canadian Unemployment Insurance Program
In the period under analysis, the Canadian Unemployment Insurance program oper-
ated in the following manner. Employees earning income in excess of a predefined
minimum in a week are deemed to have insurable earnings in that week. Both
the employee and the employer then contribute premiums at a given rate to an
Unemployment Insurance Account. If the employee works a sufficient number
of insured weeks, then upon an interruption of earnings, he may, after a two-
week waiting period, obtain weekly unemployment insurance benefits equal to a
percentage of the average weekly insured earnings received during the qualify-
ing period. The level of weekly earnings that is insurable is subject to a ceiling,
which limits the level of both the premiums that must be contributed and the ben-
efits that can be received.
The length of the period over which benefits can be received depends on the
number of insured weeks in the qualifying period, and on the national and regional
rates of unemployment. Earnings received during the benefit period may be kept if
they are less than 25% of the weekly benefit; earnings in excess of this amount re-
sult in a dollar-for-dollar reduction in benefits.
Most inshore fisheries in Atlantic Canada are organized on a coadventurer rather
than on an employer-employee basis. In the coadventurer system, the boat owner re-
ceives a predefined share of the value of the catch net of operating costs. The re-
mainder is shared evenly among the crew of the vessel. The structure of the unem-
ployment insurance program is not well suited to this kind of arrangement. It is not
obvious who should be considered the employer, how insured earnings should be de-
fined, and when an interruption of earnings is deemed to have taken place.
Usually, the fish buyer is deemed to be the employer (Regulations, s.76).4 The
insured earnings of a crewman consist of the crewman’s share. For the boat owner
(or lessee), insured earnings are deemed to be the net value of the catch after de-
ducting (a) crewmen’s shares and (b) 25% of the value of the catch to account for
operating expenses. If the boat owner’s earnings fall short of the minimum level of
earnings required for a week’s earnings to be insurable under the Act, these earnings
3 The theoretical model is discussed only briefly here, since it has been presented in greater detail in
Roy et al. (1994).
4 Regulations Respecting Unemployment Insurance, C.R.C. 1978, C. 1576.Roy 200
are deemed to be at that minimum level (Regulations, s.78). Thus, even a minimal
level of fishing activity qualifies a boat owner (but not his crewmen) for unemploy-
ment insurance.5
Fishermen are categorized into year-round and seasonal for unemployment in-
surance purposes. The requirements for classification as a year-round fisherman are
extremely stringent (Regulations, s. 84), and almost all inshore fishermen in
Newfoundland are classified as seasonal. A seasonal fisherman can receive ben-
efits only during the off season, which for most fishermen is the period between
November and May [Regulations, s. 85(7)]. For this reason, potential claimants
regard fishing benefits as inferior to benefits from regular employment, which
can be taken at any time in the year, and usually for a longer period of time.
However, to qualify for regular benefits, regular employment must be main-
tained for a minimum number of weeks during the qualifying period. For the most
part, fishermen in Newfoundland have not been able to maintain sufficient regular
employment to qualify for regular benefits.
A Model of the Length of the Fishing Season
Fishing in Newfoundland is a seasonal occupation, and boat owners, if they are ra-
tional, will decide whether to fish in a given week on the basis of a comparison of
the marginal benefits and costs of doing so. We model this decision-making process
on the basis of a theoretical analysis similar to that formulated by Ferris and Plourde
(1980, 1982).6
The model is based on the supposition that fishing income varies from week to
week during the year, primarily because of changes in resource availability (al-
though ice and weather conditions are also factors).7 Fishing income can also vary
over the season because of changes in prices and costs. However, these changes are
not a significant source of intraseason income variation in Newfoundland. Ex-vessel
fish prices are set at the beginning of the season through a process of collective bar-
gaining between the processors’ association and the fishermen’s union. While these
prices are technically minimum prices, in practice market prices rarely rise above
the negotiated levels (Department of Fisheries and Oceans 1989, 65 ff.). There is no
evidence of significant intraseasonal variation in harvesting costs. As a result, fish-
ing income is subject to diminishing returns as the fishing season is extended. This
5 Fishermen are permitted to arrange their affairs with buyers in such a way as to accumulate their
catches over more than one week, and to average the accrued value over that number of weeks [Regula-
tions, 79(5)]. As a result, earnings in weeks during which catches are high can be applied to weeks in
which earnings are lower. This procedure enables fishermen to obtain increased benefits from weeks
during which earnings exceed the ceiling, and to include as an insured week one in which earnings
would otherwise be considered below the minimum level.
6 Ferris and Plourde build upon substantial literature examining the effect of tax and social security con-
siderations on labor supply. See Rea (1977), Hannoch and Hoenig (1978), and Wales and Woodland (1979).
This literature depends on an empirical separation of income and substitution effects on the supply of labor,
which seems to have had its earliest expression in Mincer (1962), although the idea goes back to Robbins
(1930) and Jevons (1888). This literature is surveyed in Hausman (1985) and Pencavel (1986).
7 The relative importance of these factors is species-specific. Some species (e.g., cod, caplin) show sea-
sonal migration patterns which leave them vulnerable to inshore gear for only a part of the year. Other
species (e.g., lobster, crab) are more in the nature of pure depletion fisheries.
Fishing income can also vary over the season because of changes in prices and costs. However, these
changes are not a significant source of intraseason income variation in Newfoundland. Ex-vessel fish
prices are set at the beginning of the season through a process of collective bargaining between the pro-
cessors’ association and the fishermen’s union. While these prices are technically minimun prices, in
practice, market prices rarely rise above the negotiated levels (Department of Fisheries and Oceans
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relationship between fishing income and fishing weeks can be represented as a concave
function8 f = f(L), where f′  > 0, f″  < 0. It is further assumed that fishers select the level of
fishing activity which places them on the highest possible indifference curve be-
tween work and income. That is to say, they seek to maximize the value of a utility
function U(f, L), where Uf > 0 and UL < 0. This occurs at the tangency between the
f(L) function and the highest possible indifference curve,9 where f′ (L) = MRS(f, L).
The seasonal fishermen’s benefits program alters this pattern of incentives. The
benefits received supplement earnings from fishing, and, in so doing, alter the in-
centives to fish, through both income and substitution effects. The income effects
are straightforward and consistent with the standard literature referenced above. If
“leisure” (understood to mean time spent in activities other than fishing)10 is a nor-
mal good, then higher income from unemployment insurance leads to an increase in
the demand for leisure, and thus a reduction in the number of weeks spent fishing, in
order to enjoy this additional leisure.
The substitution effects are more complex and usefully represented through for-
mal modeling. The amount of unemployment insurance income, S, earned in a ben-
efit period is the product of three factors: (i) the benefit-earnings, or replacement ra-
tio, r, which is the proportion of average weekly insured earnings during the qualify-
ing period that is returned to the claimant as benefits during a week of unemploy-
ment; (ii) the average level of weekly insured earnings, E, during the claimant’s
qualifying weeks, that is the basis on which the level of weekly benefits is calcu-
lated;  and (iii) the number of weeks, B, over which the claimant is entitled to draw
benefits. Since the variables E and B depend on the number of insured weeks, L, in
the qualifying period, this relationship can be written as
S(L) = r E(L) B(L). (1)
The benefit-earnings ratio, r, is a constant, which was equal to 66% from 1972–78,
then 60% until 1990, and 57% thereafter.
Until 1983, the average value of insured earnings, E(L), was calculated over
qualifying weeks in either the entire qualifying period (which usually begins in
April), or in the last 20 weeks of this period, whichever was to the fisherman’s ad-
vantage. We assume that fishing income increases at a diminishing rate as the num-
ber of fishing weeks increases. This assumption implies that if weekly earnings are be-
low the insurable ceiling, average weekly insured earnings will decline as the number of
fishing weeks increases. This decline would have a negative effect on the level of unem-
ployment benefits, acting as a disincentive for the fisherman to extend the number of
fishing weeks. Thus, we can specify that E′ (L) ≤  0, with the strict inequality hold-
ing, where f′ (L) is below the maximum level of weekly insurable earnings.
8 The fishing weeks variable, L, should not be necessarily taken as chronologically ordered. The basic
idea is that since fishers prefer weeks when fishing income is high to weeks when it is lower, then as the
number of weeks spent fishing is increased, the income earned in the marginal week must be less than in-
come earned in intra-marginal weeks. The relationship between fishing income and fishing weeks is, there-
fore, concave. However, marginal weeks need not be weeks at the end (or beginning) of the fishing season.
9 Roy et al. (1994) also consider the case in which fishers switch between fishing and wage employment
as the marginal returns to fishing fall below the wage which could be earned in shore employment. We
do not consider this case here, partly because of data limitations, and partly because we doubt that this
case is representative of the employment options available in rural Newfoundland, where unemployment
rates are typically in excess of 20%, and shore employment is generally sporadic and unreliable. Be-
cause of low skill levels, moving costs, and a general lack of liquid cash resources, mobility into other
areas of Canada is not generally a feasible short-term option.
10 We use the term “leisure” here because it has become institutionalized in the labor economics litera-
ture. However, the term “nonmarket household production” (from which true leisure is one possible out-
put) would probably be a more accurate description of the alternative use of time by inshore fishermen.Roy 202
In 1983, the definition of the average value of insured earnings was modified so
that fishermen with at least 15 qualifying weeks of fishing would receive benefits
based on earnings in their best 10 weeks of fishing. This change would render E(L)
= E(10) for L ≥  15, and so remove the disincentive to extend the number of fishing
weeks for those fishing at least 15 weeks.
The relationship, B(L), between the number of benefit weeks and the number of
insured weeks during which income was earned can be separated into four sequen-
tial stages.
Stage 1: Here the number of insured weeks, L, is less than the minimum number of
qualifying weeks required to entitle a claimant to benefits, denoted by q. In Newfound-
land, this minimum level of insured weeks was 8 until 1978, when it was raised to 10. In
this stage, obviously, there are no benefits; i.e.,
 B(L) = 0 if L < q.
Stage 2: Once a claimant qualifies for benefits, the number of weeks that benefits
can be claimed increases with the number of insured weeks, up to some maximum
which is governed by the length of the off-season during which benefits can be
claimed. In Stage 2, this maximum has not yet been reached, so there is a positive
relationship between the number of benefit weeks and the number of insured weeks.
This positive relationship creates an incentive to extend the number of fishing weeks
in order to qualify for a longer period of unemployment benefits. Specifically,
claimants are entitled to 5 weeks of benefits for every 6 qualifying weeks, so B′ (L) =
5/6. Beginning in 1976, fishermen were entitled to a certain number of weeks called
“extended benefits,” Bext, which is independent of the number of qualifying weeks
they have worked. Thus, in Stage 2, the number of benefit weeks can be written as
the linear relationship
B(L) = (5/6)L + Bext.
Stage 3: Here the fisherman works a sufficient number of insured weeks to qualify
for the maximum number of benefit weeks, Bmax. Consequently, additional fishing
does not increase the length of the period that a fisherman is entitled to benefits.
Thus, the positive incentive to extend the number of fishing weeks which exists in
Stage 2 is removed. In this stage, we have
B′ (L) = 0, and B(L) = Bmax.
Stage 4: Ultimately, as the number of fishing weeks is extended, fishing takes place
during that part of the year when seasonal benefits can be claimed. In this stage, ev-
ery additional week spent fishing is one in which unemployment benefits could have
been received. Therefore, there is an incentive to reduce the number of fishing
weeks. Here we have B′ (L) = –1, and so (allowing for the two-week waiting period),
B(L) = 50 – L.
Overall, the relationship B(L) is piecewise linear, with four distinct segments,
and can be expressed as
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This relationship was modified by amendments in 1976 and in 1977, which altered
the q, Bext, and Bmax parameters. These changes are summarized in table 1. It should
be noted that, as a result of the 1977 changes, the levels of q, Bext, and Bmax increased
sufficiently so that (5/6)q + Bext > Bmax, and Stage 2 was eliminated.
When income from seasonal fishermen’s benefits is added to earned fishing in-
come, total fishing income, F, becomes
F(L)=   f(L) + S(L) (3)
= f(L) + r E(L) B(L).
The tangency condition can then be written as
F′ (L) = f′ (L) + S′ (L) = MRS(F, L) (4)
thus, the increased income (inclusive of unemployment insurance) from fishing an
additional week equals the marginal rate of substitution between income and leisure.
In the next two sections, we shall estimate an econometric model that consists
of the earnings-weeks relationship, f(L), and the labor supply relationship implied
by the tangency condition (4). The unemployment insurance benefits equation, B(L),
is part of the model as well, but as an identity, depending on known institutional pa-
rameters and without a stochastic component. The model is estimated on a 10%
sample of seasonal benefit recipients in Newfoundland over the period 1971–93 pro-
vided by the Department of Employment and Immigration of the Government of
Canada. The sample contains panel observations on 21,447 benefit spells involving
5,999 recipients. The data consists of information on weeks of insured employment
resulting in the benefits claim, the sum of insured earnings during this employment
spell, weekly benefit rates when unemployment occurred, and a total number of ben-
efit weeks during the unemployment spell.11 A limited set of demographic data (such
as age and sex) and economic data (such as occupational and industrial classifica-
tions) is also included. Since the data covers a fairly long period (twenty-three
years), it is typically the case that observations on a particular individual span only a
small portion of this period, and need not be contiguous observations.
11 An anonymous referee expressed concerns about data corruption arising from a possible incentive to
over-declare earnings in order to increase benefit. However, the deemed employer is required to main-
tain detailed records on fishermen’s earnings and premiums payable (Regulations, s. 77). As well, since
the employer must pay premiums which depend on the fisherman’s insured earnings, the employer has
an incentive to minimize this amount. Outright fraud does not appear widespread as a result. There are,
however, reliability concerns arising from the fact that the effect of the minimum and maximum insur-
able earnings levels is to censor such earnings both from above and from below. As a result, insured
earnings may not be the same as actual earnings. This issue is discussed in the final section of the paper.
Table 1
Unemployment Insurance Benefit Week Parameters
(Newfoundland, 1971–93)
qB ext Bmax
1971–75 8 0 22
1976 8 18 27
1977–93 10 20 27Roy 204
Econometric Estimation of the Earnings-Weeks Relationship
Let us begin with the specification of the relationship between earnings and insured
weeks. For estimation purposes, we use a log-linear approximation as follows:
fL ii i =θ
β (5)
where earnings of fisherman i, in a particular year are represented by fi, and weeks
worked by fisherman i, in that year by Li. The elasticity of earnings with respect to
the number of weeks is measured by the β  parameter, which is assumed to be the
same for all fishermen and which should be between 0 and 1. The greater the dimin-
ishing returns to an extended fishing season, the lower is the value of β . The θ i pa-
rameter reflects the productivity of the fisherman for a particular value of L. This
level of productivity is known to vary considerably from person to person, depend-
ing on factors such as experience, location, luck, and innate skills.
From the beginning, we were confronted with a serious identification problem,
the nature of which is captured in figure 1, representing the earnings-weeks relation-
ship of two fishermen with different values of the parameter θ i. Ideally, we would like to
be able to trace this relationship by controlling for the value of θ i. Unfortunately, we
cannot observe θ i directly, and so even if its value is partly captured through the use of
various correlates, much of its effect will be reflected in the equation disturbance term.
However, the number of weeks spent fishing is an endogenous variable and is unlikely
to be independent of θ i. For example, high values of θ i may be associated with a lengthy
fishing season. Therefore, variations in θ i which are not captured in the regression
could be correlated with the independent variable, Li, causing the estimate of the β
parameter to be biased. In terms of figure 1, instead of tracing an earnings-weeks
relationship, such as OF, we may instead trace a locus of tangencies such as AB.
Figure 1.  Biased Estimation of the Earnings-Weeks RelationshipFishing Behavior and Fishing Season Length 205
The standard solution to this problem is to use an instrumental variable for Li
which is related to Li, but is independent of variations in the earnings-weeks rela-
tionship as captured in θ i. The latter requirement precludes any determinants of fish-
ing productivity as instrumental variables, since these affect the earnings-weeks re-
lationship. Variables which are related to the income-leisure preferences of fisher-
men, but not to productivity differences between fishermen, would be appropriate
candidates for consideration as instrumental variables. Unfortunately, our database
does not include any variables which clearly satisfy this criterion.
Notwithstanding this dilemma, we consider that we have been able to obtain a
reasonable (although not perfect) solution to the problem in specifying the earnings-
weeks relationship [equation (5)] as an error-components relationship. Specifically,
we decompose the θ i term into an individual-specific component, α i, and a time-spe-
cific component, η t. The individual-specific component captures those aspects of
productivity which are specific to the individual over all time periods, such as innate
skill. The time-specific component, on the other hand, captures those effects which
are specific to the time period for all individuals, such as changes in resource avail-
ability, weather conditions, and product price.12 We have also incorporated an age
variable into the regression specification in order to capture individual-specific dif-
ferences that are correlated with age. The intent is to factor in differences in produc-
tivity that are due to accumulated experience.13 To the extent that older fishermen
can afford larger boats, differences in physical capital accumulation may be re-
flected here as well.
The econometric literature provides two alternative specifications for the error-
components model. The fixed-effects model specifies the individual-specific and/or
the time-specific effect as a fixed parameter to be estimated through the use of
dummy variables. To the extent that these fixed effects capture that part of θ i which
is correlated with the regressors (and particularly with Li), the estimate of the β  pa-
rameter is unbiased.
The random-effects model, by contrast, specifies the individual-specific effects,
and/or the time-specific effects, as a random variable possessing specific character-
istics. Usually, but not always, the random variable is identically and independently
distributed, and is estimated through Generalized Least Squares (GLS) (see Judge,
et al. 1985, ch. 13; Greene 1997, ch. 14.4). The random-effects model has some
methodological attractions and can be shown to lead to efficient estimation when the
model specification is valid. The main disadvantage of this model is that when the
random effects are correlated with the explanatory variables, least-squares bias re-
sults. Fortunately, the latter situation is testable by using the Hausman specification
test (Greene 1997, pp. 632–34).
We specify the time-effect as a fixed (dummy variable) effect in both models,
because the number of time periods in our analysis is small (twenty-three years),
and the time interval over which observations on particular individuals spans does
not overlap much. We have modeled the individual effect, however, as both a fixed
effect and a random effect. The fixed-effects model, after logarithmic transforma-
tion, is as follows:
12 In principle, some of these factors could be estimated directly. However, both prices and resource
availability are species-specific, and we have no information on the species makeup of the landings of indi-
vidual fishermen in our sample. Similarly, both weather conditions and resource availability vary spatially,
and the location information which is included in our sample is rather coarse and of uncertain reliability.
13 Measuring this effect is complicated by the fact that fishing is conducted in teams; therefore, the in-
come earned by a fisherman depends on the accumulated experience of the entire crew, particularly the
skipper, rather than that of only the individual fisherman. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for re-
minding me of this.Roy 206
ln ln ln , ~ ( , ) fa L it i t it it it it =++ + + αηγ β ε ε σ ε IID 0 2 (6)
where fit is the earnings of individual i at time t; ait is the age of individual i at time
t; Lit is weeks worked by individual i at time t; α i is the fixed effect specific to indi-
vidual i; η t is the fixed effect specific to time period t; and ε it is the equation distur-
bance for individual i at time t, assumed to be identically and independently distrib-
uted with zero mean and constant variance.
The random effects model, by contrast, is specified as
ln ln ln , fa L u it t it it i it =++ + ++ αη γ β ε (7)
uiu i t ~( , ) ,~( , ) IID IID 00 22 σε σ ε
where the individual effect, ui, is now a random variable which is identically and in-
dependently distributed with constant variance. The model is estimated by Feasible
GLS, with the variance components estimated using the technique outlined in
Greene (1997, pp. 626–28).
For comparison purposes, we also estimate a constrained Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) model in which the individual effects, α i, are equal for all individuals.
ln ln ln , ~ ( , ) fa L it t it it it it =++ + + αη γ β ε ε σ ε IID 0 2 (8)
The regression estimates and the estimated standard errors of the constant param-
eters for all three models are presented in table 2. In all three models, the estimated
value of β  is fairly high, but significantly below unity, ranging from 0.85 in the
fixed-effects model, to 0.94 in the constrained OLS model. The hypothesis of dimin-
ishing returns is, therefore, confirmed. The estimate of the age effect is more vari-
able, but in all cases, it is significantly positive. This is consistent with the main-
tained hypothesis that productivity rises with age. In the fixed-effect model, how-
ever, the value ascribed to this effect seems to be implausibly high.
The fixed-effects model can be used to test the hypothesis that the individual ef-
fects take the same value; in this case, the constrained OLS model would be valid.
Under the null hypothesis, when the ε it are normally distributed, the F-statistic has a
value of 5.80 with 5.998 and 15.424 degrees of freedom. At these values, the null
hypothesis is decisively rejected at any reasonable level of significance.14 The
Hausman statistic for orthogonality of the random effects with the independent vari-
ables, which under the null hypothesis is asymptotically distributed as chi-squared
with 24 degrees of freedom, has a value of 137.03, also leading to rejection of the
null hypothesis.
We conclude from these results that the fixed-effects model is the most satisfac-
tory for our purposes, because the alternative models possess significant least-
squares bias which is absent from the fixed-effects model. We do note that the size
of the age effect estimated in this model is substantially (and implausibly) higher
than it is in the other two models. There may remain some least-squares bias in the
fixed-effects model to the extent that the model errors ε it, which, by design, are or-
thogonal to both the individual effects and the time effects, are nonetheless corre-
14 Similarly, in the random-effects model, the Breusch-Pagan (1980) Lagrange multiplier test can be uti-
lized to test the hypothesis that  σ u
2  = 0, implying that random effects are absent. The value of the
Lagrange multiplier, which under the null hypothesis is distributed as chi-squared with one degree of
freedom, is 37.105, so the null hypothesis is once more decisively rejected.Fishing Behavior and Fishing Season Length 207
lated with weeks worked. However, since most of the variance in ln Lit is between-
group variance rather than within-group variance, and since this between-group
variance is, by design, independent of the model error, we think that most of the
least-squares bias has been removed from the fixed-effects model. We also note that
the estimates of β  generated by the fixed-effects and random-effects models are
quite similar, despite the fact that there is some bias in the random-effects model
which is absent from the fixed-effects model.15
Econometric Estimation of the Tangency Condition
We now construct a model of the tangency condition (4), which equates the marginal
return to an additional week of work F′ (L) to the marginal rate of substitution be-
tween income and leisure. The former concept, which we refer to as the real mar-
ginal return to work (RMRW), was derived as follows. By differentiating equation
(1), substituting the result into the left-hand portion of equation (4),  and adding ap-
propriate subscripts, we obtain
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The expression B(L) was derived from equation (2), and B′ (L) was obtained by dif-
ferentiating equation (2). The expression E′ (L) was set equal to 0 if a fisherman was
at the maximum level of insurable earnings, or working 20 weeks or more in years
before 1983 and 15 weeks or more afterward. Otherwise, E′ (L) was derived by dif-
ferentiating E(L) = f(L)/L to obtain
Table 2





α 4.088 — 4.077
(0.033) (0.050)
β 0.945 0.856 0.866
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
γ 0.063 0.873 0.133
(0.006) (0.070) (0.012)
R2 0.750 0.923 —
15 In the random-effects model, the standard error of the ui term (which is absent from the fixed-effects





































Values for Eit, fit, Fit, and Lit were obtained from the database. The value of β  was set
equal to the fixed-effects estimate obtained in the previous section. Finally, the en-
tire expression was divided by the Consumer’s Price Index for St. John’s, New-
foundland, in order to convert the expression to a real return to work.
Because of the presence of kinks and discontinuities in both the B(L) and E(L)
equations resulting from the design of the Unemployment Insurance Program, the
term F′ (L) is not defined at several values of L, and so the tangency condition (4) is
not, in general, satisfied at these points.16 We have dealt with this problem by ex-
cluding such observations from the sample used for estimation of the parameters un-
derlying the tangency condition. This is not entirely satisfactory, since a consider-
able amount of information (8,140 observations) is removed as a result. This in-
cludes those cases in which the claimant qualifies for unemployment insurance with
a minimum number of weeks—a group which is of considerable interest for policy
purposes. We shall consider this issue more fully in a subsequent section.
The expression used for the marginal rate of substitution is based on the as-
sumption that the underlying preference functions of fishermen between real income
and leisure can be approximated by the constant-elasticity-of-substitution form




where Fit/Pt is real income of fisherman i in period t; 52 – Lit is leisure enjoyed by
fisherman i at time t; δ i is an individual-specific parameter reflecting the relative
preference of fisherman i for income versus leisure; and ρ  is a parameter, assumed
to be the same for all fishermen, which is related to the elasticity of substitution σ































16 Specifically, B′ (L) fails to exist at the boundaries between the separate stages of the B(L) function,
and E′ (L) fails to exist (after 1982) at L = 15, where average insured earnings are deemed to equal the
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Setting MRSit equal to RMRWit, taking logarithms of both sides, and rearranging, we
obtain the regression equation
ln ln ln , ~ ( , )
52
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when the individual preference term δ i is treated as a fixed-effect parameter. On the
other hand, when the preference term is treated as a random effect, the optimization
equation becomes
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In both cases the ζ it term may be considered to be the effect of optimization errors
occurring due to mechanical breakdown, incorrect anticipations, and so on. It should
be noted that  ′ F it  is a function of Lit [see equation (9) above], so there is some possi-
bility that this variable is correlated with the equation disturbances vi and ζ it, creat-
ing least-squares bias.
We estimate both models, along with a constrained OLS model that imposes the
restriction that all fishermen have the same preferences, in which case the regression
equation can be written as
ln ln ln , ~ ( , )
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The regression estimates and estimated standard errors of the constant parameters
for the three models are presented in table 3. The estimate of the elasticity of substi-
tution parameter, σ , is, in all cases, statistically significant but fairly low, ranging
from 0.14 in the fixed-effects model, to 0.29 in the constrained OLS model. We can
conclude that real income and leisure are not regarded as close substitutes by this
population of fishermen.
The fixed-effects model can be used to test the hypothesis that individual prefer-
ences (as reflected in the δ i parameter) are identical, so that the Constrained OLS
model is valid. Under the null hypothesis, when the ζ it are normally distributed, the
F-statistic has a value of 3.68 with 4.981 and 8.324 degrees of freedom. The null
hypothesis is clearly (and not unexpectedly) rejected.17 Finally, the Hausman statis-
tic for orthogonality of the random preference effects with the independent variable,
which under the null hypothesis is asymptotically distributed as chi-squared with 1
degree of freedom, has a value of 242.25, once more leading to rejection of the null
hypothesis.
Again, we conclude from these results that the fixed-effects model is the most
satisfactory one, since it appears that the value of RMRW is correlated with indi-
17 Similarly, in the random-effects model, the Breusch-Pagan (1980) Lagrange multiplier test is utilized
to test the hypothesis that  σ v
2  = 0, so that random effects are absent. The value of the Lagrange multi-
plier, which under the null hypothesis is distributed as chi-squared with one degree of freedom, is
14.836, so the null hypothesis once more is decisively rejected.Roy 210
vidual income-leisure preferences, and, therefore, with the individual effect in the ran-
dom-error model. There may remain some least-squares bias in the fixed-effects model
to the extent that the optimization errors, ζ it, are correlated with RMRW. Some sugges-
tions as to how to deal with this possibility are discussed in the next section.
While it would be premature to base a full-model simulation on these results, it
is nonetheless of interest to derive some estimates of the impact that the introduc-
tion of the Unemployment Insurance Program had on the length of the fishing sea-
son. Table 4 presents three examples of individuals with preference functions and
earnings-weeks functions based on the fixed-effects models presented in this and the
previous section. The Unemployment Insurance parameters utilized are representa-
tive of the situation in 1983–89.
While the details differ from case to case, the results suggest that the program
reduced the fishing season by 8–10 weeks, and a concomitant reduction in earned
income which was more than compensated for by unemployment insurance receipts
of approximately CDN$3,000 or more per year. These are fairly significant effects.
There could, however, be counteracting effects from marginal fishermen who in-
crease their fishing to the 10-week minimum in order to qualify for unemployment
insurance. Since we have excluded such individuals from our sample in the estima-
Table 3




σ  ln δ –3.986 — –4.343
(0.043) (0.043)
σ 0.297 0.142 0.222
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
R2 0.099 0.923 —
Table 4
Simulated Effects of Unemployment Insurance Program on Fishing
Weeks Earned UI Total
Worked Income Income Income
Li fi(Li) Si(Li) Fi(Li)
Case I
With UI 12 $2,933 $3,933 $6,892
Without UI 23.3 $5,156 — $5,156
Case II
With UI 20 $4,528 $4,069 $8,597
Without UI 28.8 $6,178 — $6,178
Case III
With UI 30 $6,391 $3,014 $9,405
Without UI 37.8 $7,773 — $7,773
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tion of the tangency condition, it is arguably illegitimate to apply our model to such
individuals, and so we have not done so.
The analysis presented in table 4 is open to the objection that the span of the
simulated change lies far outside the sample space, so that the results may be criti-
cally dependent on the assumed functional form of the earnings and utility func-
tions. We may also be interested in the effects of a change in the parameters under-
lying the unemployment insurance system which falls short of scrapping the system
entirely. Table 5 simulates the effect of lowering the replacement parameter, r, from
0.6 to 0.5. Such a change is probably at the outer limits of political feasibility. The
model predicts that, in the three cases that were analyzed in the previous example,
fishermen would be induced to work an additional 1.5–3 weeks as a result of this
change. Unemployment insurance benefits would fall by an amount in the range of
CDN$500 to $800, some of which is offset by higher earned income from the longer
fishing season. The response in the short-season Case I is particularly interesting, in
that the reduction in r would induce the fisherman to increase fishing to 15 weeks in
order to take advantage of the “best 10 weeks” rule which determines average in-
sured earnings when the number of insured weeks is at this level. In this case, total
income would actually rise as a result of the reduction in benefits.18
Reducing the maximum number of benefit weeks, Bmax, from 27 to 22 would
have effects similar to those of the reduction in r in Case I and Case II, but would
have no effect on Case III, since, in this case, the season is sufficiently long that the
fisher would be taking less than 22 weeks in benefits at her preferred position. An
increase in the minimum number of qualifying weeks, q, or a reduction in the num-
ber of weeks of extended benefits, Bext, would only affect the decisions of those fish-
ing a short season, such as Case I.
Table 5
Simulated Effects of Change in Replacement Parameter, r, on Fishing
Weeks Earned UI Total
Worked Income Income Income
Li fi(Li) Si(Li) Fi(Li)
Case I
r = 0.6 12 $2,933 $3,933 $6,892
r = 0.5 15 $3,546 $3,391 $6,937
Case II
r = 0.6 20 $4,528 $4,069 $8,597
r = 0.5 21.4 $4,805 $3,391 $8,196
Case III
r = 0.6 30 $6,391 $3,014 $9,405
r = 0.5 32.5 $6,835 $2,202 $9,037
Note: Income values are in Canadian dollars.
18 This counterintuitive result is due to the discontinuous nonconvexity in the benefits function B(L)
at L = 15 which results from the operation of the “best ten weeks” rule at this point.Roy 212
Limitations and Extensions
The analysis presented above has two limitations which particularly concern us.
First, as discussed above, the level of earnings which qualify for unemployment in-
surance is subject to a weekly maximum. If earnings exceed this maximum, they are
deemed to be at that maximum for unemployment insurance purposes. Similarly, a
week’s earnings must exceed a particular level in order to qualify for insurance. If
earnings fall short of this minimum, they are deemed equal to that minimum for a
skipper, but not for a crewman. Therefore, our data on insured earnings are indi-
rectly censored upward—indirectly, because the censoring is imposed on a week-by-
week basis. Therefore, the total is censored to the degree that weekly earnings have
been censored, a matter which cannot generally be determined from our database.
Similarly, the data are indirectly censored downward for a skipper, and indirectly
truncated downward for a crewman.
Truncation and censoring can lead to bias in the regression estimates, and the
bias can sometimes be severe (see the Monte Carlo results presented in Davidson
and MacKinnon 1993, p. 538). Maximum-likelihood estimation is normally used to
estimate models with censored and truncated data. This method necessitates the
specification of an exact functional form (typically, although not necessarily, nor-
mality) for distribution of the disturbances. The methods used in the previous sec-
tions, by contrast, require only the assumption of identical and independent distribu-
tions with finite variance, a considerably weaker assumption.
While there is rich and extensive literature on the handling of censored and trun-
cated data, with our data, the standard approach must be modified to incorporate the fact
that the data consist of sums of a series of censored and truncated data, rather than di-
rectly truncated or censored data. The required modification is not a trivial one.
The second area of concern arises from the piecewise nature of the benefits
function (3), which led us to remove observations which occurred at the kinks and
discontinuities in the estimation of the tangency function. There are two problems
with this procedure. First, the procedure is inefficient because information is dis-
carded. Second, optimization errors on the part of fishermen (as a result of uncer-
tainty, for example) can result in behavior which would introduce bias into the pa-
rameter estimates.
The source of this bias is twofold (Pudney 1989, pp. 198–201). First, there is
the simultaneity bias already discussed, in that model error affects weeks worked,
which, in turn, affects RMRW. Therefore, the RMRW variable is correlated with the
model error. The second source of bias that results from optimization errors arises
when the observed and optimum positions of a given data point lie on different seg-
ments of the benefits function. For example, a fisherman who would best locate in
Stage 2 may mistakenly fish into Stage 3 as a result of overly optimistic expecta-
tions of the return to fishing in that stage. When such points are grouped into the
“wrong” segment, the value of RMRW at the optimum is calculated incorrectly.
Therefore, the resultant parameter estimates are subject to errors-in-variables bias.
A related problem is that data points whose optimum position is at the corner vertex
formed by two segments of the earnings-weeks relationship will generally not satisfy a
tangency condition defined over either segment. Inclusion of these boundary points in
the estimation will, therefore, bias the results. When fishermen make optimization er-
rors, however, we cannot readily identify those cases that possess corner optima.
These are not new problems. There exists an extensive literature (Wales and
Woodland 1979; Zabalza 1983; Phipps 1990) on the impact of piecewise-linear con-
structs, such as progressive income taxes and unemployment insurance on the length
of work spells. Maximum likelihood methods have been successfully utilized to re-
solve these difficulties (Pudney 1989, pp. 201–205). The solution of such problems,Fishing Behavior and Fishing Season Length 213
however, is simplified considerably by the assumption usually made in this literature
that work is available throughout the year at a fixed wage. Unfortunately, this as-
sumption is unsupportable in the present case. Our objective in future work is to
adopt these techniques to contexts, such as the present one, in which the “wage”
varies systematically through the year.
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